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What is blocking?
Blocking involves leaving illegal websites online but simply making ac-
cess somewhat more difficult. Access is always still possible, regard-
less of the blocking technology used.
By contrast, deletion or take-down of an illegal website involves re-
moving it from the Internet and making access impossible.
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Introduction and executive summary
The EU is considering a proposal to introduce filters for blocking of 
child abuse websites. European Digital Rights urges the Parliament 
and Council to rethink these plans. Child abuse and its portrayal on 
the Internet is a terrible crime that is sometimes of a severity that is 
scarcely believable. It must be treated seriously, with policies based 
on evidence and effectiveness and not on politics or gut reactions. 
We must avoid policies which give Member States the opportunity to 
adopt cosmetic measures that we have already seen being used as a 
replacement for real action. Evidence from countries that have im-
posed blocking proves conclusively that this policy is employed as a 
replacement for real international action and is not applied as a com-
plementary measure.
Creating a system to limit access to information brings with it huge risks:
• Weakening the political pressure on Member States to take real, effect-
ive, international action.
• Undermining the EU’s credibility when addressing restrictions on com-
munications in repressive regimes.
• Causing “mission creep” as the pressure inevitably grows – particularly 
in  response to  media  headlines  –  to  spread blocking measures  into 
more and more areas.
• Bringing an end to the neutrality of the Internet as Internet Service Pro-
viders (ISPs) are forced to invest in technologies that can discriminate 
in increasingly invasive ways between different types of content.
We cannot simply launch a web blocking policy hoping that it  might do 
some good – the benefits must be shown to outweigh the costs. The Com-
mission’s preparatory work did not treat the issue with the attention it de-
serves:
• Why has no evidence been presented to show that there is a percept-
ible benefit in the countries that have already introduced blocking? 
• Why have the significant legal concerns raised by recent independent 
research1 not been addressed by the Commission?
• Why has no research been carried out by the Commission regarding the 
scale and root causes of the problem of illegal sites being left online?
1 http://www.aconite.com/blocking/study
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EU approach on child abuse is weak and badly 
targeted
In order to protect  certain business interests,  extreme, disproportionate 
and potentially illegal measures are taken to remove or punish unauthor-
ised activities.  For child protection,  the approach goes to the other ex-
treme – measures that are both weak and directionless. All  of our efforts 
must focus on ensuring that the police and judiciary have the resources to 
remove child abuse sites, prosecute criminals and identify victims. Any-
thing else is a counterproductive distraction.
Business priorities Child protection priorities
In 2004, IFPI’s (International Federation of 
the Phonographic Industry) internet anti-pir-
acy unit secured the take-down of 60,900 
websites (Digital Music Report, 2004).
Some child abuse websites, hosted in coun-
tries with which the EU has excellent inter-
national contacts, allegedly remain online 
for months after being identified.
In the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA), the United States demands remov-
al of alleged copyright infringing sites.
EU “needs” to introduce blocking as it 
claims that these criminal websites are too 
difficult to address more effectively.
Bank  phishing  websites  removed after  an 
average of 4 hours.
Child abuse sites remain online for an aver-
age of 4 weeks.2
All international trade agreements signed by 
the EU contain binding obligations on pro-
tection of intellectual property.
There are no binding and enforceable inter-
national agreements that ensure rapid take-
down of child abuse websites.
The European Commission invested 
500,000 Euro in a project to investigate the 
impact of counterfeiting in the EU. It also 
paid one million Euro for a  project on the 
impact of consumption of counterfeit goods. 
European Commission policy on blocking is 
based on assumptions, due to a “lack of ac-
curate and reliable statistics” (according to 
the Commission’s “impact assessment”).
Hollywood targets 50,000 peer-to-peer 
users with lawsuits (March 2010).
EU: No policy on peer-to-peer with regard 
to child abuse images. 
The Commission supports a permanent 
secretariat for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement.
The Commission stated in its impact as-
sessment that it believes Member States 
will not implement the Council of Europe 
Convention adequately or fast enough. This 
is the justification given for proposing the 
Directive on Child Exploitation – more legis-
lation rather than better enforcement.
2Tyler Moore and Richard Clayton: The Impact of Incentives on Notice and Take-down. Seventh Annu-
al Workshop on Economics and Information Security (WEIS08), Dartmouth NH, USA, June 25-28 
2008. In: M. Eric Johnson, editor: Managing Information Risk and the Economics of Security, pages 
119-223, Springer, New York, 2008.
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The issue is distorted by myths
“Internet blocking works”
Not only can end-users simply circumvent blocking, but criminals can eas-
ily evade it as well. The Canadian hotline observed3 one website move 
212 times in 48 hours – the introduction of blocking would encourage crim-
inals to set up systems whereby they would move their site automatically 
when they detect that they have been added to a blocking list. 
“Opponents of blocking believe that child abuse is a free speech 
issue”
Nobody has ever suggested that child abuse is an issue of freedom of 
speech or is the expression of an opinion. Free speech and freedom of 
communication will be the inevitable collateral damage of the building of 
the censorship infrastructure necessary for Internet blocking.
“The sites are in ‘rogue states’ where cooperation is impossible”
The material in question is almost exclusively based in western countries 
with high levels of Internet infrastructure. Although it appears this problem 
is now being addressed, EU hotlines have consistently said that the USA 
is home to the largest proportion of the illegal material.4
“We are talking about ‘child pornography’ so free speech laws 
prevent effective international action”
The most important of these sites are the ones containing depictions of 
sexual violence and abuse against children. This is universally illegal. We 
are morally (and under international law legally) obliged to take all pos-
sible action to ensure that the sites are deleted, the victims are identified 
and rescued, and the criminals involved are prosecuted. 
“Is it not better to do something?”
Every legislative intervention has costs for society. In the absence of any 
clear benefits for blocking, it is bad practice to propose a wide-reaching 
measure with such substantial costs in terms of “mission creep” (the inev-
itable spread of blocking to other types of content), “technology creep” (the 
inevitable development of more and more invasive blocking technologies), 
damage to the EU’s reputation for defence of free speech and the risk of 
providing an “early warning system” for owners of illegal sites.
3 http://www.cybertip.ca/app/en/research
4 http://www.hotline.ie/annualreport/2008-analysis/trends.html
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Deleting instead of blocking sites is the only 
effective approach
Tackling the problem and not the symptom
Most child pornography material is not on freely available websites. Other, 
less obvious methods such as peer-to-peer networks and chat rooms are 
more amenable to hiding such illegal activity. Organised crime is clearly 
never going to be tackled by weak technology and weaker investigations. 
Real human beings with real resources are needed to tackle real crime. 
Deletion of the material is possible
The Cambridge University  study5 comparing  the take-down of  financial 
fraud  websites  and  child  abuse  pages  shows  that  we  can  do  better. 
Without  a  proper  impact  assessment  identifying  the  current  procedural 
and legal problems and which jurisdictions are the most problematic and 
why, effective policy-making is rendered much more difficult than it should 
be.
The blacklist will not be restricted to abuse sites
British ISPs were promised that government demands would be limited to 
“voluntary”  blocking  of  child  abuse  sites.  In  April  2010,  legislation  was 
passed that  creates a framework for  blocking websites associated with 
civil offences of the unlawful sharing of intellectual property.
Danish ISPs were promised that government demands would be limited to 
“voluntary” blocking of child abuse websites. This was followed in early 
2010 with a proposal to make ISPs criminally liable for providing access to 
gambling websites.
In the Frankfurter  Allgemeine Zeitung on 13 April,  2010,  Commissioner 
Malmström both talked about  other subjects that could be blocked and 
more invasive technologies for blocking.
Blocking lists cannot  be published,  yet  not  publishing them means that 
proper transparency and safeguards are virtually impossible.
Did you know that in February 2010 a European Parliament resolution “strongly criti-
cised” companies providing the Iranian authorities with censorship tools? Web blocking in 
Europe will increase the market for research, development and selling of such tools. 
5 Supra note 2 See: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/takedown.pdf 
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Blocking attempts to address yesterday’s problem
Data from EU hotlines shows that blocking aims to solve yesterday’s prob-
lems – static sites exclusively hosting illegal material.  Figures from the 
UK’s Internet Watch Foundation6 show that the number of domains host-
ing illegal material has dropped by around half in the past four years. 
Web-based material  is  now increasingly  hosted on legitimate free  web 
space, image hosting sites or hacked websites. Such sites are obviously 
eager to remove illegal material as quickly as possible – rendering block-
ing irrelevant. The misuse of legitimate image hosting sites to spread illeg-
al material has grown from 0% in 2004 to 10% in 2006 and 40% in 2009. 
Through its failure to adequately identify, let alone address, these trends, 
the European Commission is proposing a “solution” which is inadequate 
and counterproductive in order to solve the problem as it existed in 2004. 
The proposal also does nothing to address the bigger problem of peer to 
peer trafficking of abuse images.
Is  the cost  of  creating  this  blocking infrastructure,  the  cost  of  mission  
creep, the cost of technology creep and the human cost of not spending 
these resources on victim identification worth the “benefit” of addressing  
an ever-smaller part of the problem with deficient technology?
Accessing blocked material is not “only for experts”
The European Commission and certain lobby groups have been propagat-
ing the myth that blocking is so difficult to work around that only someone 
“motivated” or an “expert” could manage to do it. 
Websites exist, such as www.proxyforall.com or www.zend2.com, where a 
user can simply input the “blocked” page and they will receive immediate 
access. 
Alternatively,  people  who  access  the  Internet  using  privacy  enhancing 
technologies (the development of which is funded by the Commission), 
are likely to find themselves accidentally circumventing blocking systems.
Finally,  you can search for  one of  the many instructional videos online 
which explain to you in five minutes or less how to bypass your Internet 
provider’s equipment and therefore any blocking that it has installed.
6 IWF annual reports 2006 and 2009 (http://www.iwf.org.uk) and BBC news site: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/10108720.stm
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States hide behind empty gestures 
Historically, EU Member States have preferred making noises about child 
protection to real international action. Repeated failures to respect interna-
tional agreements demanding action on child abuse show the dangers of 
allowing Member States to hide behind blocking policies.
1990 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and 2000 Optional 
Protocol on child pornography
Article 34: “Take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral meas-
ures to prevent the exploitative use of children in prostitution or other un-
lawful sexual practices.”
1996 Stockholm Declaration
“Concerted action is needed at the local, national, regional and interna-
tional levels to bring an end to the phenomena.”
1999: ILO Convention on the worst forms of child labour
“Each  Member  shall  [...]  take  effective  and  time-bound  measures  to 
provide the necessary and appropriate direct assistance for the removal of 
children from the worst forms of child labour.”
2000 UN Optional Protocol on sale of children, child prostitution and 
child pornography 
The 22 EU Member States that have ratified this Protocol are obliged to 
take “all necessary steps to strengthen international cooperation by multi-
lateral, regional and bilateral arrangements for the prevention, detection, 
investigation, prosecution and punishment of those responsible for acts in-
volving the sale of children, child prostitution, child pornography.” 
2001 Yokohama Global Commitment
“We reaffirm, as our primary considerations [...] enhanced actions against 
child prostitution, child pornography and trafficking of children for sexual 
purposes, including national and international agendas.”
The time to take effective, proportionate and durable action is now. States must not be 
given another media-friendly non-action to hide behind.
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Leading experts say “no” to blocking
“Blocking websites has little long term impact on distribution.” 
Grant Agreement signed by the European Commission and the European Financial 
Coalition Against Child Pornography (January, 2010)
“Our blocking measures are unfortunately not  leading to a reduction in  
web-based pornography.” 
Björn Sellström 
Head of Swedish Police Investigation Group on Child Pornography and Child Abuse
“Sweden’s Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt says he has stressed the mer-
its of uncensored Internet access in a meeting with Chinese Vice Presid-
ent Xi Jinping. Reinfeldt says they discussed human rights,  democracy 
and the freedom of expression ‘and I especially emphasized ... the signi-
ficance of the Internet in that context.’ ”
 Business Week (30 March 2010)
“Technically, it is difficult. Legally, it is problematic. Above all, it represents  
a real threat to the free transfer of  information and conflicts with basic  
democratic principles.” 
Cormac Callanan, co-author of Council of Europe report
on cooperation between Internet service providers and law enforcement authorities
“According to the ECtHR, ‘necessity’ within the meaning of Article 10(2)  
implies the existence of a ‘pressing social need’ [...] it is undoubtedly more  
difficult  to satisfy the necessity test for Internet content,  because users 
seldom encounter illegal content accidentally.”
Report of the OSCE Representative
on Freedom of the Media on Turkey and Internet Censorship
“Blocking clearly  is  disproportionate,  as the infrastructure implementing 
this measure will spread into other technologies and topics completely un-
related to child abuse images.”
Christian Bahls
Chairman of the Association of Abuse Victims against Internet blocking
Did you know?
On her blog, Commissioner Malmström has accused the United States of leaving child 
abuse websites online for over a year in some cases. If this is true, the lack of effective 
engagement with the USA on this issue means that all EU Member States have failed to 
respect their obligations under both the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child to take positive international action to ensure 
child protection. 
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The Commission’s policy-making is incoherent
Why was no external expertise requested?
Why does the explanatory memorandum of the proposed Directive explain 
that there was “no need for external expertise” while the Commission is 
paying for external expertise with regard to policy (including the feasibility 
of blocking) on terrorist use of the Internet?
Why is internal Commission information not public?
The European Commission requires the hotlines that it funds to provide 
statistical  data regarding the reports that  they receive.  This information 
could have been used to demonstrate the impact of blocking. Why, after 
paying for these statistics, is the Commission hiding them? 
Why give the Member States a smokescreen if they can’t be trusted?
The Commission’s impact assessment on the proposed Directive on child 
exploitation says, in essence, that the Member States cannot be trusted to 
implement the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children 
against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse. Why then allow Member 
States to hide their  own inactivity by putting the emphasis  on blocking 
rather than taking real action? 
What specifically is blocking supposed to achieve?
The Commission says that blocking will limit accidental access to illegal 
sites. Where is the evidence that this is a major problem that means that 
resources  should be spent on blocking rather than,  for  example,  victim 
identification?
To what does the European Commission attribute its total failure in 
its international cooperation? 
How has it been possible for both the EU and individual Member States to 
achieve so little for so long, with so little hope of improvement, that block-
ing is seen as the only option?
Did you know?
Blocking is an approach – not a technology. As technologies change, the implications of 
mandatory blocking will  change without any democratic intervention as to whether the 
latest innovation respects privacy or human rights.
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The Commission facilitates illegal action by 
Member States
When the Commission launched its original proposal, the blocking meas-
ures would have required laws to be introduced in the Member States. 
This is necessary to be in compliance with Article 10 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights  – “the exercise of these freedoms [...] may be 
subject to such formalities [...] as are prescribed by law.” 
This need for a legal basis was confirmed in the otherwise rather empty 
impact assessment. “Such measures must indeed be subject to law, or 
they are illegal.”
In the Council, Member States such as the United Kingdom, that already 
have “voluntary” blocking, opposed this measure as they did not want to 
introduce legislation.
As a result, the European Commission amended its proposal to simply re-
quire “measures” to be taken to bring about blocking instead – thereby 
avoiding the opposition of the countries that carry out blocking without a 
legal basis. 
It is clearly inappropriate for the Commission to actively, consciously and  
deliberately alter its proposal for the sole reason of facilitating an activity  
that it believes is in contravention of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.
The proposal abandons basic principles of better 
regulation
According to the European Commission, the purpose of an “impact as-
sessment” is “to help in structuring and developing policies. It  identifies 
and assesses the problem at stake and the objectives pursued.”7
The Commission’s “impact assessment” does not address the limitations 
of current blocking technologies, the implications of possible future block-
ing technologies, the societal dangers of the inevitable blocking of inno-
cent sites, the impact of the likely spread of blocking to other types of con-
tent, the nature of the problems that lead to criminal websites remaining 
online for extended periods, the possible impact of less intrusive meas-
ures nor the impact of blocking in countries where it has been imposed.
7 http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/impact_en.htm
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Blocking by self-regulation – the beginning of the end 
of the open Internet
The European Commission’s proposal was amended before publication in 
order to ensure that blocking via “self regulation” would be possible. 
This “self-regulatory” approach is part of a much wider strategy of using 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to police the Internet, in a less predict-
able, less democratic and more pervasive way than regulation undertaken 
by the state. Some current initiatives include:
• The draft Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) suggests limiting 
ISP legal protection from liability unless unspecified policing “policies” 
are put in place by ISPs.8
• The Council of the European Union in its resolution on IPR enforcement 
calls for “the Commission, the Member States and the relevant stake-
holders to pursue ongoing dialogues and to resolutely seek agreements 
on voluntary practical measures.”9
• Discussions  on  Internet  blocking  among  the  Member  States  are  re-
portedly  leaning towards  “self-regulatory”  measures rather  than them 
having a legal basis, as required by Article 10 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights.
• The European Commission’s dialogue on “notice and take-down of illeg-
al content” and “stakeholder dialogue on illegal up/downloading” aim to 
achieve extra-judicial policing activities by Internet providers.
• UK ISP Virgin Media has indicated that it will start wide scale surveil-
lance of its customers, while Irish ISP Eircom has undertaken to carry 
out both “three strikes” policies and website blocking in response to al-
legations of intellectual property infringements.
Did you know?
Criminals will be able to check if their sites are on blocking lists and move them to other 
locations automatically, if necessary. As a result, blocking risks becoming a useful tool for 
protecting criminal activities rather than an effective measure to fight cybercrime.
8 http://blog.die-linke.de/digitalelinke/wp-content/uploads/674b-09.pdf 
9 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/intm/113098.pdf 
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Case study: Italy
In Italy, blocking is undertaken for multiple purposes, by multiple agencies 
and with and without the protections required by the European Convention 
on Human Rights.
Italian Monopoly Administration Authority (AAMS)
The Italian Monopoly Administration Authority has drawn up a blacklist of 
approximately 1750 websites that provide various gambling services. This 
list is public and ISPs are obliged by law to block all of the sites.
Italian police
Building on the secret CIRCAMP international blocking list, the Italian po-
lice have added further sites without judicial intervention. This makes a 
total of between 600 and 900 sites which they claim contain child abuse 
images. Internet providers are legally obliged to block all of these sites.
Judiciary
Court orders are also used to add to the list of sites to be blocked by ISPs 
in Italy. Sites blocked include an anti-mafia website (accadeinsicilia.net10) 
for being an unauthorised press publication, a consumer organisation, for 
defamation (aduc.it), a free online advertising website for facilitating prosti-
tution (bakeca.it) and a file sharing site (thepiratebay.com).
Other types of blocked content
Sites facilitating the purchase of cigarettes abroad, a website containing 
information about steroid use,  a Korean university website,  for  reasons 
that are not immediately obvious, and a gay website have also been ad-
ded to blocking lists.
Mission creep
The next steps to limit the right to communication in Italy include the Peco-
rella-Costa  bill  to  impose  press  obligations  on  ordinary  websites,  the 
Carlucci law (written by the audiovisual lobby) to ban anonymity online, 
the Alfano law imposing a "right to reply"  to anyone who says their  in-
terests were undermined by a blog, the Pisanu law to log (with personal 
identification) all Internet connections including via WiFi, etc.
10 No longer online.
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